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Abstract
Purpose – This study aims to analyze the inﬂuence of taxes and corporate governance on the dividend
policy of Brazilian companies.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors identify the changes of the tax legislation in Brazil in the
period 1986-2011 and check their effect on corporate dividend policies for preferred and common shares. The
authors use panel data Probit and Tobit estimation to verify the probability of companies to pay dividends
under different tax regimes. The ﬁnal sample comprises 672 companies, 1,159 traded stocks and 30,134
observations
Findings – The authors’ results suggest that changes in the tax legislation have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
dividend payments. Also, ﬁrms do not follow target payout ratios, but dividends are moderately dependent on
past payments. Dividend payouts are affected by stock voting rights, privatization and dividend
deductibility. Changes in regulation that reduce the agency problems among shareholders affect positively
payout ratios.
Practical implications – For managers, maximizing shareholders’ value requires taking into account the
consequences of the taxation when designing ﬁnancial policies for the ﬁrm. For investors, stock portfolio
selection should take into account payout behavior and how changes in dividend taxation affect stocks’ value.
For policymakers, the effects of changes in the tax code on corporate behavior are of utmost importance to
stimulate private investment and economic growth.
Originality/value – There are several tax law changes in Brazil within the period analyzed, creating a
good opportunity to study the effect of taxation on dividend policy and its dynamics over time.
Keywords Dividends, Corporate governance, Taxes, Interest on equity
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
One of the main and more complex corporate ﬁnancial decisions deals with the deﬁnition of
the ﬁrm’s dividend policy, that is, the trade-off between distributing funds to shareholders
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and retaining the proﬁts within the company. Marginal corporate and individual tax rates
are one of the main factors that corporations ponder in such decision. Among emerging
markets, Brazil is known as a country where such marginal tax rates are high, which
suggests that companies pursue active tax planning strategies, which include changes in
their dividend policies in response to changes in the tax legislation. This paper tests the
inﬂuence of the tax preference theory on public Brazilian companies and is motivated,
fundamentally, by the many changes in the tax legislation that Brazil has been through in
this period, which makes for a good laboratory to study this problem.
Another relevant aspect of this paper is the legal framework of corporate law in Brazil,
which allows a ﬁrm to issue up to two-thirds of its total equity in nonvoting preferred
shares. Therefore, to hold complete sway over a public corporation in Brazil, the controlling
shareholders may have as little as 16.7 per cent of ﬁrm’s total equity. Such disproportional
power raises obvious agency problems betweenmajority andminority shareholders.
Such legislation was originally established in 1976 by Act 6404/1076. It has been
changed in 2001 by Act 10303/2001, which limited the maximum proportion of nonvoting
shares to one-half. However, the new legislation preserved the status of existing companies.
Thus, the new requirement applies only to ﬁrms, who were either created or went public
after 2001, preserving the statutory privileges of existing ones.
To investigate such problem, we collect data on 672 ﬁrms listed in the São Paulo Stock
Exchange (Bovespa) between 1986 and 2011, making up a total of 30,134 observations. We
identify the pertinent changes of the tax legislation and check the effect of such exogenous
changes on corporate dividend policies of preferred and common shares of listed ﬁrms.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a brief history of taxation law applied
to dividend payments in Brazil. Section 3 summarizes previous empirical literature on this
subject in Brazil. Section 4 presents the research method and describes the sample. Section 5
presents the results of our analysis. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Tax legislation on dividends and capital gains in Brazil (1986-2011)
Brazil has gone through several changes in its taxation regarding dividend payments in the
past couple of decades. Between 1986 and 2004, there were four major changes in such
legislation. Also, taxation on capital gains from stock trading has changed once for
individual investors and has not changed for corporations. In addition, two other legislation
changes that indirectly affect ﬁrm’s dividend policies have been implemented in this period.
Here, we brieﬂy summarize such legislation.
2.1 Tax treatment of dividends and capital gains in Brazil
In the period between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 1988, dividend payments to
individuals were taxed according to three different tax rates (according to Decree 1790/1980,
Articles 1 and 2; Decree 2065/1983, Article 1-I and Decree 2303/1986, Article 7): 23 per cent if
the distributing company was publicly listed (except for ﬁrms from the agriculture industry
whose proﬁts originated from these activities); 15 per cent if the distributing company was
from the agriculture industry (whose proﬁts originated from these activities); and 25 per
cent for all remaining cases.
If the beneﬁciary was a ﬁrm, then there were two tax rates: 23 per cent if the beneﬁciary
was a publicly traded company, a tax-exempt ﬁrm (except for pension funds), a subsidiary
of a publicly traded corporation or when the distributing ﬁrm was from the agriculture
sector (whose proﬁts originated from these activities); and 25 per cent for all remaining
cases.
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From January 1, 1989 to January 1, 1996, several changes have occurred in the tax
legislation. Table I summarizes such legislation changes in the case of an individual or
corporate beneﬁciary, including legal basis.
Regarding taxes on capital gains in Brazil, corporations have been taxed on capital gains
also at the ﬂat rate of 15 per cent since 1977, according to Decree 1598/1977, Article 31
(Brazil, 1977). Such legislation has not changed since. Individuals, on the other hand, were
exempt from capital gains taxes until 1988. Since 1988, however, individuals have been
taxed also at the ﬂat rate of 15 per cent, according to Act 7713/1988, Articles 2 and 3 (Brazil,
1988) and Act 8981/1995, Article 21 (Brazil, 1995a, 1995b). Table II summarizes the
legislation on capital gains taxes.
The reader should keep in mind that this paper refers to periods of taxation as follows:
TAX2 – exempt, except for the net income; TAX3 – exempt; TAX 4 – taxation; TAX5 –
exempt. The Brazilian legislation becomes complex in the case where shares are transferred
to the heirs of a deceased individual. If the heirs opt for the transference according to market
value, then they are subject to tax incidence, according to Act 9532/1997, Article 23, § 1
(Brazil, 1997). However, if the transference is made according to the historic value recorded
in the previous tax returns of the deceased, then there is no taxation according to Act 9532/
1997, Article 23 (Brazil, 1997).
Compared to the USA, the Brazilian taxation may be considered generous, as its rates are
well below the ones practiced in the USA. Table III, based on Elton, Gruber and Blake (2005),
revised with recent Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data, reports the changes in dividends
and capital gains tax rates in the USA in the period of our study. Brazilian tax rates are
roughly half of those in the USA.
2.2 Dividends for nonvoting preferred stocks
Preferred shares in Brazil were introduced by Decree 21536/1932 and modiﬁed by Act 6404/
1976. According to this piece of legislation, preferred nonvoting shares are entitled to either
of the following preferences:
 preference in dividend payouts;
 preference in share repurchases with or without a premium; and
 both of the previous preferences.
In 2001, Act 10303/2001, Article 17 (Brazil, 2001) rewrote the dividend preference, explicitly
calling for a ﬁxed or minimum dividend instead of the vague “preference” of the previous
legislation. Moreover, its ﬁrst paragraph went further in restricting the trading of preferred
nonvoting shares in case they did not include at least one of the following preferences:
 a dividend of a least 25 per cent of net earnings or 3 per cent of book equity and
equality of treatment to common stocks regarding dividends;
 a dividend at least 10 per cent higher than the one to common stocks; or
 equality of treatment to common stocks regarding dividends, share repurchases and
takeover offers with or without a premium (mandatory bid rules or tagalong rights).
Which such preference each company attributes to its preferred shares must be explicitly
stated in the company’s acts of incorporation. Therefore, the new legislation aimed to reduce
the discretion of majority (voting) shareholders in the expropriation of minority (nonvoting)
shareholders through the dividend policy. Nonetheless, the legislation is still timid to fully
address the agency problem betweenmajority andminority shareholders in Brazil.
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Summary of changes
in the tax legislation
on dividends in
Brazil
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2.3 Deductible “interest on equity capital”
In 1996, Act 9249/1995 (Brazil, 1995) came into effect introducing the concept of “Interest on
Equity Capital” (Juros Sobre o Capital Proprio – henceforth IOEC). This legislation in its
Article 9, §7, allows ﬁrms to partially deduct payments of dividends as operating expenses.
Article 9 of the Act, incorporating Articles 347 and 668 of the Income Tax Regulation of
1999 (Brazil, 1999a), limits the deductibility to a maximum of twice the amount of interests
paid or received by the ﬁrm, as well as to the amount resulting from the computation of the
ofﬁcial long-term interest rate on book equity. IOEC paid out, according to the Internal
Revenue Service’s Instruction 11/1996 (Brazil, 1996, Article 30), is subject to a ﬂat tax rate of
15 per cent retained at the source. Such legislation in effect created a tax incentive to equity
capital – however limited – equivalent to the tax beneﬁt of debt that is usual elsewhere in the
world. To the best of our knowledge, such legal provision is unique to Brazil.
Therefore, Brazil offers a peculiar legal frame to test the tax preference theory of
dividends. As dividends have become gradually tax-free while capital gains have become
more taxable over time, with different tax rates in different periods, we expect that dividend
payouts increase when the tax rate on dividends decreases and/or the tax rate on capital
gains increases. Also, until recently, dividend policies for common (voting) and preferred
(nonvoting) stocks have been subject to the discretion of controlling shareholders at the
expense of minority shareholders.
2.4 Stock voting rights and corporate governance regulations
Stock voting rights in Brazil have been established by Act 6404/1976 (Brazil, 1976) in its
Article 15, §2, which allowed ﬁrms to issue up to two-thirds of its shares in nonvoting
preferred classes. Such legislation allowed shareholders to hold absolute controlling interest
in any public ﬁrm with as little as one-sixth of its shares plus one share. Of course, such
disparity between voting and cash ﬂows rights increased the agency problem between
majority and minority shareholders, where the latter may be subject to wealth expropriation
by the former.
Table II.
Taxes on capital
gains in Brazil,
1977-2011
Taxpayer Period Rate (%) Legal basis
Individuals 1976-1988 Exempt Decree 1510/1976, Article 4
Individuals 1989-2011 15 Act 7713/1988, Articles 2 and 3
Corporations 1977-2011 15 Decree 1598/1977, Article 31
Source:Authors of the paper
Table III.
Maximum tax rates
on dividends and
capital gains in the
USA
Year Tax rate on dividends (%) Tax rate on capital gains (%)
1988-1990 28.00 28.00
1991-1992 31.00 28.00
January 1996 to June 1997 39.60 28.00
July 1997 to December 2000 39.60 20.00
January 2001 to December 2001 39.10 20.00
January 2002 to May 2003 38.60 20.00
May 2003 to 2011 15.00 15.00
Source: Elton et al. (2005) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS), USA
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In 2001, Act 10303/2001, Article 2 (Brazil, 2001), modiﬁed the previous legislation reducing
the maximum proportion of nonvoting shares to 50 per cent. However, such change applies
only to ﬁrms that go public (Initial Public Offering) and to those public ﬁrms that prepare
seasoned equity offerings after the promulgation of the Law (Brazil, 2001, Article 8, §1).
Moreover, the minimum capital that any shareholder must commit to a public ﬁrm to have
absolute control over it is still only 25 per cent.
Also in 2001, Bovespa launched its “Novo Mercado” (New Market), a special listing
segment designed for shares issued by companies that voluntarily undertake to abide by
corporate governance practices and transparency requirements in additional to those
already requested by the Brazilian Law and the Brazilian Securities and Exchange
Commission, from 2004 to 2011, 103 companies entered the “Novo Mercado”. Such special
segment requires, among other things, one vote–one share rule. In that year, Bovespa also
launched two intermediary listing segments for ﬁrms wishing to gradually improve its
corporate governance standards. These levels (Level I and Level II), however, tolerate the
existence of nonvoting shares even though they introduce new disclosure and ﬂoating
requirements. Despite being an improvement over the previous regulation, the new rules are
still timid steps toward the international corporate governance standards.
3. Previous empirical evidence on dividend policy in Brazil
Several empirical studies on dividend policy have been conducted in Brazil. The pioneer
study by Brito and Rietti (1981) replicated the well-known study by Elton and Gruber (1970),
testing the Clientele Effect in the Brazilian market, between years 1973 and 1976. Their
study did not ﬁnd any evidence of the existence of this effect in the Brazilian stock market.
The authors concluded that, in opposition to the North American stock market, in Brazil, it
does not seem to have any association betweenmarginal levels of investors’ taxation and the
preference for retention or distribution of dividends.
Procianoy and Poli (1993) discussed the possibility of a dividend policy that could
simultaneously produce large tax savings to investors and encourage more liquidity in the
stock market and, as a consequence, higher share values. The authors concluded that
companies that would adopt their suggested policy would get a substantial increase in share
prices. The investors would look for shares that could give them the larger possible net
earnings, as a result of tax savings. The clientele effect was central to this new outﬁt, and, in
such case, the dividend policy was relevant andmaximized the value of the company.
In another study, Procianoy and Snider (1994) observed that changes in the tax
legislation on dividends and capital gains, in 1989, offered an opportunity to test the
maximization of shareholder wealth through dividend payouts. At the time of the legislation
change in 1989, there was an inversion of tax burden: up to that year, dividends were taxed
and capital gains were not, and, from 1990 on, capital gains were taxed and dividends were
tax-free. The study tried to determine if an increase in payout ratios by companies listed in
Bovespa has really happened after the tax legislation changed. The authors identiﬁed that,
for the period from 1987 to 1988, the average dividend payout ratio was 25 per cent when
dividends were taxed. Meanwhile, from 1990 to 1992, when the dividends were tax-free, the
average payout ratio was 40 per cent. Therefore, the authors concluded that after the tax
legislation has changed the dividend payouts have generally increased. However, the
increase has not been veriﬁed in all companies, as suggested by the observed decrease of the
minimum dividend. The authors also cautioned that their sample was small. In conclusion,
Procianoy and Snider (1994) observed that, after the Brazilian tax legislation change, there
was an increase of dividend payouts, but they were not increased to the 100 per cent level,
which, according to the authors, would be the ideal rate. They also stated that companies
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that had more controlling shareholders had a more signiﬁcant increase in dividend payout
ratios than the companies that had just a single controlling shareholder.
Another study about dividend policy and taxes in Brazil is the paper of Procianoy (1996),
motivated by the change in the Brazilian legislation with respect to dividends that happened
in 1988 and 1989. This change stopped taxing the dividend distribution by the companies
(23 per cent on dividend value retained at the source) and instead started taxing capital
gains in 25 per cent, which should be calculated from the difference between the sale and
purchase prices (including adjustment for inﬂation), a tax rule that was effective from 1990
to 1993. Using data from Bovespa from the years 1987 to 1992, Procianoy (1996) tested two
hypotheses: the changes in dividend policies by the companies listed in Bovespa; and the
maintenance of a new dividend policy, in the period between 1990 and 1992. The author
concluded that taxation is one of the factors that inﬂuence the companies’ dividend policy. In
his conclusion, the author also highlighted that the agency conﬂict between managers and
shareholders may be responsible for the adoption of non-maximizing shareholders’ wealth
dividend policies.
In a recent paper, Vancin and Procianoy (2016) ﬁnd that the legislation has an important
role in the determinants of dividend policy. They ﬁnd that there is strong empirical evidence
that companies paying dividends above the legal mandatory level present different
determinants from those that only pay the minimum level. Thus, the samples that mix
companies that pay both the mandatory minimum dividend and above the minimum
inﬂuence regression coefﬁcients, resulting in signiﬁcant biases in dividend determinants in
Brazil. As companies that pay above the mandatory levels are the real decision makers of
dividend policies (given that other companies simply comply with the legislation), this
aspect must be taken into account when studying dividend policy in countries where
minimummandatory dividend legislation is in place.
Ramos (1997) studied the inﬂuence of taxes on dividends in the Brazilian stock market,
adjusting the returns for systematic risk levels. Following Litzenberger and Ramaswamy’s
(1979) method of augmented capital asset pricing model, the author focused on two distinct
periods: from 1984 to 1987 and from 1988 to 1992. The model states that, in equilibrium, the
expected net return of a stock is linearly related to its systematic risk and its dividend–price
ratio. Ramos’s (1997) results indicated a signiﬁcant and positive coefﬁcient for the two
subperiods. His conclusions support the hypotheses that dividend taxation inﬂuences the
stock returns inBovespa.
Nossa and Nossa (2007) investigated the economic performance of Bovespa’s listed
companies that distributed dividends or repurchased their shares in the period 1995-2004.
The authors found that ﬁrms that paid dividends had comparatively increased positive
returns in every single year of the sample, while ﬁrms that repurchased shares increased
their returns only in the years 1997, 2002, 2003 and 2004.
Mota and Eid (2007) analyzed the choice of the method of payout policy of companies
listed in Bovespa from 2002 to 2005. From the three distribution options (dividends, IOEC
and shares repurchases), they found that dividends are preferred to IOEC, in spite of the
latter’s tax deduction advantage. Also, share repurchases are usually used as a complement
to dividends and IOEC, mainly because of its higher transaction costs and lack of legal
obligation.
Decourt et al. (2007) test if the changes of the payout ratios point to variations on net
earnings in the year prior to and subsequent of dividend payment. Using a sample of listed
companies from 1997 to 2005, the authors document that an increase of dividend payout
does not signal future earnings, but reductions are correlated to the increasing in
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contemporaneous net earnings and also signal increase in the future earnings. Apparently,
earnings retentions signal good investment opportunities.
Ciofﬁ and Famá (2010) analyzed if dividends could be used as a proxy for other
information that contribute for the prediction of future returns, to test the effect of signaling
on the market value of companies. The authors found that dividends affect positively the
value of the companies, in accordance with other studies from Brazil and other countries.
Forti and Schiozer (2011) found a positive relationship between dividends and past
earnings, when looking at dividend policy of Brazilian banks. This evidence reinforces the
use of dividends to inform the quality of assets when sending a sign that the bank is capable
of making proﬁts with assets that perform well. Furthermore, privately held banks pay
more dividends than publicly traded banks, which complies with the purpose of dividend
signaling.
In contrast, Fiorati et al. (2007) studied whether the variation in earnings distribution
policy (dividends and IOEC) had any relationship to the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability in subsequent
years. Using a sample of public ﬁrms from 1994 to 2004, the authors could not document a
signiﬁcant relationship between earnings payouts and future ﬁrm proﬁtability. The authors
suggest that such result may be because of market conditions and the legal and institutional
politic–economic organization.
Futema et al. (2007) have performed a solid analysis of the capital structure, dividends
and IOEC of Brazilian companies in the period 1995-2004, following the Fama and French
(2002) model. They aimed to contribute to the joint understanding of capital structure and
dividend policy in Brazil. They concluded that, as predicted in the static trade-off and
pecking order theories, the proﬁtability and growth options are the most inﬂuential
variables on earnings distribution.
Pohlmann and Iudícibus (2010) show that there is a positive relationship between the tax
level on income and debt level. This was also observed for companies with high debt and
low proﬁt taxation. These results support the theory of trade-off regarding the impact of
taxation on proﬁt over debt decision, and consequently over the capital structure.
Nakamura et al. (2007) investigate the basis of dividend policy deﬁnition by Brazilian
companies. Their results indicate that companies with better growth opportunities tended to
pay lower dividends, and larger companies tended to pay larger dividends, under the
hypotheses that they would face less future restrictions to banking loans, as well as lower
transaction costs in case of an eventual issue. The authors conclude that dividends are
deemed relevant by Brazilian ﬁrms along the lines of the Lintner’s (1956) and agency
theories.
Futema et al. (2009) conﬁrm the predictions of pecking order, that is, the distribution
of earnings varies positively with proﬁtability and negatively with investment, but that
do not happens with grow opportunities, which have a negative relationship with
earnings distribution. Another positive factor for pecking order is the negative
relationship observed between leverage and proﬁtability, conﬁrming that companies
use retained earnings to ﬁnance their investments and only use debt after running out
of internal sources.
As it has been shown above, the study of dividend policy in Brazil raises interesting
questions regarding the relationship among dividends, capital structure, taxation, corporate
governance and institutions. Moreover, Benetti et al. (2007) document that 62.9 per cent of
Brazilian ﬁrms surveyed afﬁrm to pay dividends, a larger sample share than Graham and
Harvey (2001) report in their sample of North American ﬁrms (53.9 per cent). Such is the
motivation of this study.
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3.1 Previous empirical evidence on corporate governance and dividends in Brazil
Agency problems have a central role in the deﬁnition of dividends policy (Ferreira et al.,
2010). The commitment to corporate governance practices can reduce the risk for investors
because of a raise in shares value caused by best practices, ultimately increasing the
liquidity and trading volume of the shares because of increased demand.
With the increase in the value of a company stock, there may be, consequently, a
reduction in their cost of capital. For the company, it means fundraising at lower costs, with
the likelihood of higher returns on investments, and for shareholders, higher dividends
(Rabelo et al., 2007).
Silva (2004) shows that there is a relationship, often statistically signiﬁcant, between
governance structure, market value, leverage and dividend policy of the Brazilian
companies. Gonzaga and Da Costa (2009) show that there is a relationship between
accounting conservatism and conﬂicts over dividend policies between controllers and
minority shareholders in Brazilian companies.
The ﬁnancial corporate governance model seems to address the greatest number of
features that apply to the Brazilian reality, given the importance it assumes the agency
conﬂict (even if not always explicit) between controlling and noncontrolling shareholders
and the importance attached to returns on investments (Bertucci et al., 2006).
Companies who have American depositary receipts Level II or participation in the “Novo
Mercado” segment of Bovespa have higher returns in periods of crisis and distribute more
dividends (Srour, 2005).
Bellato et al. (2006) show that there is a negative and signiﬁcant relation between excess
vote power in possession of the controllers and the dividend rate of the companies. Their
study reinforces the arguments of the codes of good governance practices that the distance
from the one share–one vote principle is detrimental to minority shareholders.
Through these studies, we can see that there may be a relationship between the levels of
corporate governance and dividend policy. In companies where governance levels are
higher, the tendency is that the dividend policy is more aggressive to distribute more
dividends to its shareholders.
4. Research methods
We test the hypothesis of the inﬂuence of the Brazilian tax changes on the dividend policy of
its listed companies. The sample is made up of companies whose shares are traded in São
Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa), in the period 1986-2011. The data source is from
Economática® (2012) database. The ﬁnal sample comprises 672 companies in the period
1986-2011, making up a total of 1,159 traded stocks of both common and preferred classes.
We have also included companies with multiple classes of preferred stock, but kept in the
sample only those whose dividend rights are similar, for homogeneity. As we used annual
data frequency, the total sample contains 30,134 observations over the sample period.
Firms whose government or governmental bodies have a controlling stake are classiﬁed
as state-owned. Privatized ﬁrms are coded as state-owned up to (and including) the
privatization year, and as privately controlled henceforth. Some companies of the sample
had a relevant ownership – but not the controlling stake – of the national development bank
(Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social – BNDES), through its holding
subsidiary BNDESPAR. In spite of having such a relevant stake from a government
institution, these companies are treated as private companies.[1]
Firm-level data are the dividends per share and earnings per share, both adjusted for
inﬂation using the Augmented Consumer Price Index, which is the default inﬂation index of
Economática® (2012) database. Dividend per share values are year sums obtained in
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December 31st of the respective year from 1986 to 2011 and include the values of IOEC, paid
in the same year. The variables are standardized by their book value of assets, to remove
any systematic size effect.
A panel data analysis is performed according to the followingmodel:
DPSit ¼ b 0 b 1EPSit þ b 2DPSit1 þ b 3COMMONi þ b 4STATi þ b 5IOECit
þ b 6GOVi þ
X4
k¼1
b 6þkTAXk þ b 10þk EPSit  TAXkð Þ
 
þb 15 EPSit  GOVitð Þ þ « it: (1)
Where DPSit is the ﬁrm’s i dividend per share in period t; EPSit is the ﬁrm’s i earnings per
share in period t; COMMONi is a dummy variable for common stocks; STATi is a dummy
variable for state-owned companies (privatization dummy); IOECit is a dummy variable
when ﬁrm i paid IOEC in year t; GOVit is a dummy variable when ﬁrm i was listed on any
corporate governance listing level in year t; TAXk is the dummy variable for each taxation
period (1986-1988; 1989-1992; 1993; 1994-1995; 1996-2011); b j are the coefﬁcients to be
estimated and « it is the regression residual.
Equation (1) is estimated as pooled panel data model (simple stacking of time series and
cross-section data) using Probit and Tobit estimation. To verify the probability of
companies to pay dividends, we use probit, which transforms the dependent variable in a
dummy variable, being equal to 1 for ﬁrms that distribute dividends in that year or equal to
0 for ﬁrms that did not distribute. In the Tobit model, which is applied to variables strictly
positive, with the accumulation of values at 0, the dependent variable can take any positive
value in its probability distribution, being used in a manner similar to the probit. In this
study, Tobit will provide the determination of the amount of distributed dividends, not just
the propensity pointed by probit. For treatment of outliers, we applied the winsorization
process on DPS and EPS. Winsorization has the advantage of reducing the extreme values
of the sample without reducing the number of observations as other alternative outlier
treatments such as simple trimming for instance. Descriptive statistics are presented in
Table IV.
A panel data speciﬁcation is useful in this case because it allows the use of a larger
number of observations, therefore increasing the degrees of freedom, reducing the
collinearity between exogenous variables and reducing the missing variable bias (Hsiao,
1986). We choose the Tobit speciﬁcation based on Kim and Maddala’s (1992) ﬁndings that
suggest the importance of accounting for the large number of zero observations in empirical
dividend studies. Also, the authors conclude that Tobit estimates, including lagged dividend
dependent variables and earnings per share independent variables as well as industry, ﬁrm-
speciﬁc and time effects, seem better equipped to deal with heteroskedastic errors and other
speciﬁcation problems in models of dividend behavior.
We expect that ﬁrms would increase their dividend payments in relation to earnings
whenever the taxation on dividends decreased (1989-1993 –TAX2 – and 1996-2011 –TAX5)
and/or taxation on capital gains increased (1989-2011). The coefﬁcients b j of EPSit and any
interaction terms of this variable in equation (1) represent payout ratios under different
taxation regimes. We also expect an increase in payout ratios for the companies that are
under corporate governance rules introduced by the new legislation and special listing
segments, indicating whether corporate governance has any impact on the agency problem
betweenmajority andminority shareholders.
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5. Results
5.1 Estimation results
The estimation results using Probit and Tobit methods for equation (1) are presented in
Tables V and VI, respectively. Analyzing probit ﬁrst, we have similar results to other
empirical works on the performance of portfolios comprising companies with high levels of
corporate governance (Rabelo et al., 2007) and on dividend payment (Srour, 2005), which
brings evidence that companies with higher levels of corporate governance are more prone
to pay dividends. The coefﬁcients of the variable GOV were statistically signiﬁcant and
robust in all regressions.
Companies that distribute IOEC are more likely to distribute dividends too, as shown by
the variable IOEC, which remained statistically signiﬁcant and positive in all regressions.
The variable STAT suggests that there is a statistically signiﬁcant and negative
relationship between state-owned companies and dividends payment, i.e. the probability of
state-owned companies to pay dividends is lower.
We ﬁnd a lower probability of common stocks to pay dividends, as we observe a
negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the COMMON variable. This does not come as a
total surprise given that the legislation change of 2001 (Act 10303/2001) required that ﬁrms
with preferred nonvoting stock should choose one among three possible preferences: a
minimum dividend, a dividend at least 10 per cent higher than the commons stock dividend
or tagalong rights. Nevertheless, as our sample covers a large period before this regulatory
change (1986-2011), this result is an indication of the behavior of ﬁrms toward nonvoting
stocks in a more ample perspective[2].
Although the results for the variable EPS are not statistically signiﬁcant for the probit
model, they are signiﬁcant for the Tobit model, as we will see further. For now, it is worth
only to observe the positive sign of the coefﬁcients, pointing to a positive relationship
between dividends and earnings per share. Lag Dep, which is the lagged dependent variable
(DPS), shows that if the company paid dividends in the previous period, then the probability
of paying them again increases.
TAX3 period suggests that the likelihood of paying dividends increases in 1993, perhaps
because it is exempt from taxation. The interactions TAX3-EPS and TAX5-EPS suggest
that the effect of earnings per share in the likelihood of dividend payments is higher in these
two tax periods, i.e. as predicted, an increase in earnings per share in periods which are
exempt from taxation also increases the probability of dividend payments.
The interaction between the variables GOV-EPS is statistically signiﬁcant and positive
in all regressions, strongly suggesting that ﬁrms in special corporate governance listing
segments that had increases in their earnings per share increase the likelihood to pay
dividends. This result complies with other empirical work on corporate governance and
performance of companies listed in Bovespa (Freire et al., 2010).
The results of Tobit regressions (Table VI) show that the EPS is positive and signiﬁcant,
unlike the probit model, suggesting that an increase in earnings per share of a company
increases the amount of dividends distributed. The lagged dependent variable (Lag Dep)
showed the same results of the probit model, suggesting that if the company paid dividends
in the earlier period, then it would pay larger amounts too. That is an indication that ﬁrms
pursue a persistent dividend policy.
The interactions TAX2-EPS and TAX3-EPS for Tobit regressions are also aligned with
the probit, showing that, in periods of less taxation TAX2 and TAX3, an increase in
earnings per share would increase the amount distributed as dividends. The interaction
TAX4-EPS shows that during TAX4, there would be a reduction of the amount distributed,
which makes sense because such period was one of higher taxation. For the period TAX5,
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when there was no incidence of taxes, the interaction suggests that an increase in earnings
per share would also increase the amount distributed, which is consistent with the tax
preference theory.
The variables COMMON, STAT, GOV and IOEC for Tobit regressions were statistically
signiﬁcant, as was the probit model, suggesting that common stocks and state-owned
enterprises pay less dividends, companies that distribute IOEC also have higher total
payouts, as do companies with higher levels of corporate governance. Also consistent with
our probit results, the interaction GOV-EPS for Tobit regressions suggests that the effect of
corporate governance increases the amount distributed by companies that had an increase
in their earnings per share.
5.2 Robustness tests
To check for the robustness of the ﬁndings, we reestimate equation (1) using three different
dependent variables as follows: DBV (the ratio between dividend/book value of the share),
Payout and Yield (results omitted for the sake of concision but available upon contact with
the authors).
Using DBV as the dependent variable, we observe the same results as the original model
for almost all independent variables, for both methods probit and Tobit, only with a few
changes in the signiﬁcance level. The dependent variable Payout also kept the same results
as the original model, presenting only a few changes in the signiﬁcance level, and the
interaction TAX4-EPS presented signal changing. The dependent variable Yield also kept
the results practically constant, presenting only a few changes in the signiﬁcance level, and
signal changes for the interactionTAX2-EPS and forTAX4 andTAX5 in the probit method
with ﬁxed effects.
6. Conclusions
This study aims to investigate the tax preference theory of dividends in a sample of 672
Brazilian public ﬁrms for the period 1986-2011. We documented several changes in the tax
legislation of dividends over the sample period and tested their effect on dividend payments
using probit and Tobit regression analysis. Our ﬁndings suggest that the Brazilian ﬁrms do
not follow target payout ratios, but they do try to pay dividends that are moderately
dependent on past payments. The level of dividend payment is affected by stock voting
rights, privatization, dividend payments deductibility provisions and changes of corporate
governance rules. Changes in the tax legislation have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on dividend
payout ratios, corresponding to the theoretical prediction. Payout ratios are positively
affected by changes in regulation that reduce the agency problems among shareholders of
the ﬁrm.
We have documented that the tax preference theory found empirical support in the
Brazilian environment, given the numerous changes in the tax regulations over the year.
Our results highlight the inﬂuence of taxation in the payout policies pursued by publicly
listed ﬁrms. These results have a range of implications for managers, investors and
policymakers. For managers, it is clear that maximizing shareholders’ value requires taking
the consequences of the taxation – at the corporate and personal levels – into account when
designing ﬁnancial policies for the ﬁrm. For investors, the choice of which stocks to include
in their portfolios should take into account their payout behavior and how it is affected by
changes in dividend taxation. Finally, for policymakers, it becomes clear that taxes drive
ﬁrms to change their payout policies and, possibly, their investment and ﬁnancing
strategies as well. Therefore, a careful study of the effects of changes in the tax code on
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corporate behavior is of utmost importance if the goal to stimulate private investment and
economic growth is in the agenda of the authorities.
Another important aspect raised by our results is that of the role of agency conﬂicts in
dividend policies. We found signiﬁcant positive effects in dividend payouts for ﬁrms that
belong to special corporate governance segments of the stock exchange – ﬁrms that
voluntarily adopt better practices toward its outside shareholders, thus reducing agency
problems. Also, state-owned companies seem to systematically and signiﬁcantly less likely
to pay dividends. These ﬁrms are known to be generally more opaque and less accountable
to outside investors than privately held enterprises – thus more prone to exacerbate agency
conﬂicts. Therefore, we ﬁnd evidence that agency problems are also important determinants
of dividend decisions in Brazil, along the lines of Easterbrook (1984).
In sum, we conclude that taxation does affect dividend policy, as shown by the
coefﬁcients of the regressions, and also that agency problems are an important issue when it
comes to dividend payments. Further studies in the ﬁeld of corporate governance of
Brazilian listed corporations may provide a better understanding of this subject and guide
future regulation reforms.
Notes
1. Although relevant, such ownership is clearly of a minority nature (between 5 and 40 per cent of
voting shares – 22.45 per cent on average – in only 11 out of 672 ﬁrms in our sample). Therefore,
we choose to treat such ﬁrms as privately owned. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing
this out.
2. We are thankful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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